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Statutory Interpretation, Morality,
and the Text
Lawrence M. Solan†
In this essay, I wish to explore the question of whether
certain approaches to statutory interpretation can be regarded
as wrongful. My argument concerns instances in which
interpreters take advantage of linguistic accident to license
arguments that flout the intent or purpose of a law.
Philosopher Bernard Williams calls reliance on literal meaning
in this manner “fetishizing assertion,”1 and considers it
tantamount to lying.
If linguistic practices that rely too heavily on linguistic
accident are wrongful, then serious ethical questions present
themselves to the legal system. For if we acknowledge the
problem, we then are forced to ask ourselves how comfortable
we are with a rule of law that cannot rely fully on the law as
written to sustain its legitimacy. In this brief essay, I raise
these issues, and comment on their relationship to questions of
judicial candor in cases concerning the interpretation of
statutes. I conclude that especially when there is doubt about
meaning, or suspicion that the legislature has erred, it is
essential to turn to the purpose of the law in order to avoid the
moral consequences of assertive fetishism. I further argue that
recourse to purpose, contrary to the views of many, actually
reduces the range of judicial discretion, and that those who
associate purposive interpretation with judicial activism
appear to be subject to a cognitive bias—the conjunction
fallacy.
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1
BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS 100-10 (2002).
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MORALITY, SPEECH, AND INTERPRETATION

Lying is an immoral act—at least most of the time. It is
prohibited in many legally relevant contexts. Lying under oath
is perjury.2 Lying in business affairs is fraud.3 Lying to
government officials is a crime in itself.4 Lying in the course of
acting as a lawyer is sanctionable misconduct.5
In some, but not all, of these contexts, misleading
another person into believing to be true something the speaker
believes to be false is also both immoral and legally prohibited. A
truthful, but misleading, statement can be just as much a fraud
as a false statement.6 In fact, fraud is defined to include both
species of deception. In some instances, it might even seem
worse for a person to scheme to misdirect his target through a
series of truthful statements than it does to tell an outright lie.
While the liar has to take responsibility for his falsehood, the
deceiver can feel virtuous at not having said anything false
while arriving at the same result: successfully leading someone
to believe something to be true that the speaker knows is false.7
For this reason, many moral philosophers draw no distinction
between the two.8 Bernard Williams goes even further,
denouncing reliance on the truth for moral justification of a
fraudulent act as immoral in its own right.9
How does deception work? Like persuasion, deception
depends on a change in the state of mind of the hearer (or
reader).10 To succeed, the deceiver calculates the inferences that
a person is likely to draw from a speech act and leads the
target to draw just the inferences that will accomplish the task

2

18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006).
For definitions, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525-26 (1977).
4
See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
5
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT § 8.4 (2010).
6
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 529 (“Representation Misleading
Because Incomplete: A representation stating the truth so far as it goes but which the
maker knows or believes to be materially misleading because of his failure to state
additional or qualifying matter is a fraudulent misrepresentation.”).
7
See Jonathan E. Adler, Lying, Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating, 94 J. PHIL.
435, 439-40 (1997).
8
See, e.g., T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 320 (1998);
JENNIFER SAUL, LYING, MISLEADING AND WHAT IS SAID (forthcoming) (manuscript at
10-13) (on file with author).
9
WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 100-10.
10
Philosopher J.L. Austin refers to this as the “perlocutionary effect” of the
statement. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 108 (J.O. Urmson ed., 1965).
3
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of deception.11 The better the calculation, the more likely the
deception. And these calculations are easy enough, at least
much of the time. It is not at all difficult to deceive, because we
are all aware that people tend to draw the inferences we intend
them to draw in everyday conversation. In fact, we say the
things we do with those inferences in mind. If I ask you, as
your guest, “where’s the telephone,” we both understand that I
am asking you if I can use the phone, and the assumption is
that I will not use it in a way that will cost you money (or at
least no more money than our relationship would bear within
the bounds of politeness). Neither of us has said any of this, but
I know what you will infer before I speak. In essence, we both
apply Grice’s cooperative principle, which says that we
construe conversations to proceed as a cooperative interaction,
drawing whatever inferences we need to draw for that to
happen.12 You draw those inferences as the hearer, and I adjust
what I say around the inferences that I (correctly, we hope)
predict that you will draw.
Now, let us assume that you and I are negotiating some
kind of deal. I know that if you speak with Hannes before
signing on the dotted line, you will find out that the deal is
unfair to you, and I also know that you want to speak to Hannes
because you value his counseling. It is the kind of conversation
that you would only have with Hannes in person if he is
available. I would rather that you and Hannes not speak. You
ask: “Have you seen Hannes recently?” I answer truthfully: “I
saw Hannes in Washington last week.” What I didn’t add was
that Hannes is now staying at a hotel in New York two blocks
from where we are having our conversation, and that I just had
dinner with him there last night. With only a little luck, your
trust in me will cause you to snap at the bait, and I will be home
free. In our story, I have committed an immoral act, whether or
not you believe that telling an actual lie would have been an
even greater affront (I personally do not think so).
Now let us ask whether, just as one can act immorally
by misdirecting someone with statements that are literally
truthful, one can act immorally by construing a statement of
another in a manner consistent with the words, but
11

This perspective is consistent with the signal approach to communication,
described in Cheryl Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons from
Positive Theories of Communication and Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957 (2007).
12
H. P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS 41, 45 (P.
Cole & J. Morgan eds., 1975).
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inconsistent with the inferences that the context dictates would
be reasonable to draw. That is, can I commit a reciprocal moral
wrong if I make it your problem that your words can be
construed in a manner contrary to your intended
communicative desires, and perhaps, contrary to your
interests, even when I know what you are trying to say? I think
the answer is yes. Going back to our conversation about
Hannes’s whereabouts, let us assume that, after seeing Hannes
in Washington last week, I have not seen him since. I have no
idea where he is now. You, however, would gain some
advantage from my acknowledging that I had seen him
yesterday, although I hadn’t. You then tell others that I did not
deny having seen Hannes yesterday when I said that I had
seen him last week, and that I spoke indirectly when you asked
about Hannes, casting suspicion on my honesty. You never lie,
but you have insincerely taken my words to imply things I
never intended them to imply, and that the normal rules of
implicature would not support. This makes you an immoral
listener, just as the first story made me an immoral speaker.
Of course, your immoral act does not end with your
having intentionally misconstrued my words. For you have not
only misconstrued them, but you have presented your
interpretation to others knowing that you did not fairly report
the substance of my message, in order to deceive them without
presenting them with a bald-faced lie. I will not here address
the morality of the person who privately perverts the intended
meaning of a communication without letting anyone know
about it. When the distorted interpretation is reported, though,
the interpretive act has been transposed into a deceptive
speech act, which is precisely what we saw to be
uncontroversially immoral above. That is why the two acts are
reciprocal moral wrongs.
Moreover, we would draw the same conclusions about
your morality if you were to take advantage of an error I made
in what I said. Assume that I met Hannes on Tuesday of last
week. We both know this because you were also there. In a
subsequent conversation with you, I accidentally refer to
having seen Hannes on Wednesday. We both know that by
Wednesday, Hannes had flown to London, and that I didn’t see
him that day and could not have seen him that day even if I
had wanted to see him that day. Nonetheless, knowing that I

2011] STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, MORALITY, AND THE TEXT 1037

had made a simple speech error,13 you find a way to take
advantage of the fact that I said Wednesday instead of
Tuesday, perhaps implying that I was scheming with Hannes,
or that I am a liar, or something else that you know not to be
true. Again, you never lie, but you construe my words both
insincerely and ungenerously, and then report your construal
to others. Lawyers do this all the time when they engage in
aggressive cross-examination of an opposing witness. It is
insincere in that context, whether or not it is justified or
required by the lawyer’s obligation to advocate zealously.
Should statutory interpreters behave similarly? Nothing in the
nature of the adversarial system, which is what justifies the
cross-examiner, suggests that they should be given similar
license.
II.

USING STATUTORY LANGUAGE TO FLOUT PURPOSE

I suggest that judges sometimes behave toward
legislatures and toward litigants just as you behaved toward
me in our hypothetical stories about Hannes, whether you took
advantage of an inference that was available but not a fair
interpretation of my words, or whether you took advantage of a
mistake. They take advantage of linguistic indeterminacy to
interpret language that undermines the communicative intent
of the speaker, in this case, the legislature. Sometimes, the
indeterminacy results from a presumed chain of inferences, as
in our hypothetical. At other times, it results from vagueness or
from ambiguity. In still other cases, judges take advantage of
errors in drafting.
Before I illustrate this point with examples from case
law, I wish to make two points. First, these problems do not
arise in every case. Typically, cases involve precisely the
situation that the statute was enacted to address. Thus, as is
13

In everyday interactions, we routinely compensate for grammatical errors
of others and construe the utterances as they were intended to be construed. For recent
studies, see Lyn Frazier & Charles Clifton, Jr., Quantifiers Undone: Reversing
Predictable Speech Errors in Comprehension, 87 LANGUAGE 158 (2011). Frazier and
Clifton note that such compensation for grammatical errors may be more prevalent in
informal speech than in the construal of formal writings, a fact obviously relevant to
the legal context. See id. at 167-68. This distinction among registers suggests that
individuals confronted with obvious errors in formal settings are more likely to be
consciously aware of the mistake, and then must decide how to construe the language:
as literally written, or as an error. The fact that we so routinely compensate for speech
errors in a manner respectful of communicative intent suggests that self-consciously
doing the opposite in formal settings flouts social norms and is construed as such.
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often true with controversial statutory cases, we are dealing
with situations that occur at the margins. Moreover, even when
judges have the opportunity to flout the legislature’s intent or
purpose, they usually do not do so because they regard their
roles, at least in part, as furthering the will of the legislature.14
This essay, then, is truly about outliers.
Second, the judicial practices that I criticize might be
defended as the best practices even if I am right that they are
laced with immoral linguistic games. That is because sticking
closer to the text than to a set of expected inferences has its
own systemic advantages, many of which are described in the
literature defending textualism.15 One may argue that the risk
of an occasional misreading of communicative intent is a small
price to pay for the democratically salient principle of
legislative primacy. This argument is convincing in some
contexts, but not in the ones that form the subject of this essay.
I return briefly to this question later.
The cases that most clearly illustrate my point are ones
in which the statute is susceptible to multiple interpretations,
whether because of syntactic ambiguity, lexical ambiguity, or
vagueness (i.e., the case involves a borderline case of a
statutory word), and a court chooses to ignore the purpose of
the legislation and to take advantage of the linguistic opening.
Consider Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., decided by
the Supreme Court in 2007.16 It is an unfair employment
practice under the Civil Rights Act to discriminate against “any
individual with respect to his compensation . . . because of such
individual’s . . . sex.”17 Ledbetter claimed that she was being

14

See, for example, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2010), for a
recent case in which the majority opinion, 131 S. Ct. at 1080-81 (Scalia, J.); the
concurring opinion, 131 S. Ct. at 1085-86 (Breyer, J., concurring); and the dissenting
opinion, 131 S. Ct. at 1086-87 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), all make specific reference to
the intent of the legislature. I discuss the debates about the propriety of referring to
legislative intent, and the fact that judges of all political and philosophical stripes refer
to such information in LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND
THEIR INTERPRETATION ch. 3-4 (2010).
15
See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW (1997) (arguing that since statutes are legislatively enacted and
intentions are not, that the proper role of courts is to construe only the language of the
statutes themselves); John Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387
(2003) (arguing that with an enhanced theory of word meaning, it becomes less
necessary to look outside the statutory language itself, thus constraining judicial
decision making).
16
550 U.S. 618 (2007).
17
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a)(1) (2006).
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paid less because of her sex.18 The statute has a 180-day statute
of limitations. Although her claim was filed more than 180 days
after the discrimination had allegedly begun, Ledbetter argued
that her claim was timely as long as it applied only to those
paychecks issued in the past 180 days.19 In other words, her
claim was that each time that Goodyear paid her less than they
would have paid her if she were male, she had been subject to
discrimination.
In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected this position,
accepting instead Goodyear’s argument that the ordinary
meaning of “discriminate” would focus on the decision to pay her
less, made long ago, and not on the ministerial act of cutting a
paycheck.20 Of course, the Court was right about that. And the
Court does often employ the canon that statutory words should
be construed in their ordinary sense.21 Justice Scalia has
explained that the canon is used as a surrogate for investigating
intent: “The question, at bottom, is one of statutory intent, and
we accordingly begin with the language employed by Congress
and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language
accurately expresses the legislative purpose.”22
Nonetheless, it defies common sense to think that
Congress intended to create a safe harbor for salary
discrimination not discovered within six months. As Justice
Ginsburg noted in dissent, unlike promotion decisions,
compensation decisions are “hidden from sight,” and
comparative information becomes known only after time, if at
all.23 The decision literally gives an employer leave, after six
months, to say to an employee, “I just want you to know that I
am paying you less because you are a woman, and I have been
doing it for long enough that I can do it forever.” The statutory
language licenses the majority decision—it is surely not
without basis. But the majority has taken advantage of a
linguistic opening to flout the purpose of the statute. I suggest
here that this practice is morally wrong in everyday life, and I
can see no reason for it to be less so when judges engage in it.
18

Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 621-22.
Id. at 624-25.
20
Id. at 628-29.
21
For discussion of the ordinary meaning canon, including linguistic
justification, see SOLAN, supra note 14, at 53-81.
22
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (quoting
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57 (1990); Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly,
Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
23
Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
19
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In 2009, Congress amended the law to make this interpretation
no longer available, requiring that the statute of limitations be
reset with the issuance of each paycheck.24
More difficult are cases in which it appears that the
legislature erred. Unlike cases involving statutes whose literal
meaning is ambiguous, these cases actually do pit the literal
meaning of the statute against the goals that the legislature was
attempting to accomplish. And not all errors are the same, as
Jonathan Siegel pointed out in his important work on this
issue.25 The easier of these cases involve scrivener’s errors in
which the legislature seems to suffer a written slip of the tongue.
United States v. Locke26 illustrates this problem. A statute
requires that a person claiming mineral rights on federal land
file a statement with the Bureau of Land Management “prior to
December 31 of each year.”27 Although it is possible that
Congress intended to require that claimants file by December
30, the likelihood is that Congress meant to say “by” instead of
“prior to.” Thinking that the statute required only that the claim
be filed by year end, Locke filed his claim for his mineral mine in
Nevada on the last day of the year.28 The Bureau of Land
Management held him in default of the filing requirement and
proceeded to take away the mineral rights.29 The situation was
made worse by the fact that a member of Locke’s family had
called the Bureau’s office and was told that the filing had to be
made by the end of the year.30 However, the doctrine that the
government may not be estopped as a result of its errors made
this fact appear to be legally irrelevant.31
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s majority opinion showed
little sympathy for the Lockes. On its face, such an opinion,
although perhaps justifiable in its respect for the language that
24

Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. It is
often the case that legislative overrides of judicial decisions occur in so-called “plain
language” situations where a court argues that it has no choice but to rule in a manner
that the legislature no doubt did not intend. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 347 (1991). For
discussion of congressional overrides in the context of the civil rights laws, see Deborah
A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of
Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511 (2009).
25
Jonathan R. Siegel, What Statutory Drafting Errors Teach Us About
Statutory Interpretation, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 309 (2001).
26
471 U.S. 84 (1985).
27
43 U.S.C. § 1744 (2006).
28
Locke, 471 U.S. at 89-90.
29
Id. at 90.
30
Id. at 89 n.7.
31
Id.
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the legislature actually used, is morally questionable. The legal
system is taking advantage in two different ways of a
legitimate misunderstanding that the system itself caused: by
enacting a statute that was “a trap for the unwary,” as Judge
Posner has noted,32 and then by misinforming a member of the
public about what the law said because the government
workers themselves had fallen into the trap. I would hold
Justice Marshall and those who voted with him morally
blameworthy if it were not for a footnote in the opinion that
threatened the government with abandonment of the “no
estoppel” doctrine when the case was remanded.33 Lawyers for
the government read the footnote and gave the mineral rights
back to Locke.34 Thus, the case successfully applauds languagebased rule of law values without allowing one side or the other
to take undue advantage of a communicative error. Most cases,
however, do not accomplish these goals simultaneously.35
Less nuanced is Judge Bybee’s dissenting opinion in
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit
Service, Inc.36 The Class Action Fairness Act liberalizes removal
to federal court of class actions filed in state court, and calls for
removal decisions to be appealed as follows:
[A] court of appeals may accept an appeal from an order of a district
court granting or denying a motion to remand a class action to the
State court from which it was removed if application is made to the
court of appeals not less than 7 days after entry of the order.37

This is obviously a legislative error. Congress meant to say “not
more than 7 days . . . .” What sense does it make to say that an
unsuccessful party must wait a week, and then has until the
end of time to appeal? Arguing that the language should be
applied as written, Judge Bybee adduced textualist rhetoric.

32

RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 267-68 (1990).
Locke, 471 U.S. at 89 n.7.
34
I describe this history in more detail in SOLAN, supra note 14, at 109.
35
For one that does not, see Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007), in which
a judge had misinformed a prisoner of the time that he had to file an appeal, and the
Supreme Court ruled that the law should be interpreted literally, since the statute was
jurisdictional in nature, id. at 206-07, an interpretation that is legitimate, but not
necessary given the statutory language.
36
448 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2006) (Bybee, J., dissenting). For further
discussion of this case, see Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of
Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117 (2009), and my response to Professor Siegel, Lawrence
M. Solan, Response, Opportunistic Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 225, 22829 (2010), http:///www.pennumbra.com/response/104-2010/solan.pdf.
37
28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
33
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Arguing that Congress did not make a scrivener’s error, which
a court might have the right to correct, Bybee continued:
Section 1453(c)(1) makes perfect sense; it is fully grammatical and
can be understood by people of ordinary intelligence. That we think
Congress might choose a different word if it decides to redraft the
statute hardly means that someone made a “typographical error”
that the court may blithely correct. “‘It is beyond [the Court’s]
province to rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and to provide
for what we might think . . . is the preferred result.’”38

Of course, the fact that the sentence is grammatical has
nothing to do with whether the legislature committed an error
in drafting. Bybee would have been on stronger moral grounds
had he forthrightly admitted that the legislature made an
error, but that in his view the legal system should trade some
of its moral authority in an individual case for certainty, which
brings credibility to the system. Instead, he engaged in
fetishizing the assertion notwithstanding the legislature’s
obvious communicative intent.
Finally, let us look at a more difficult situation, one in
which the legislature erred by writing a statute inconsistent
with its purpose not because it used the wrong language, but
because it based its legislative decision on erroneous facts.
Consider United States v. Marshall,39 a case that is well known
to law students. It pits Judges Easterbrook and Posner against
each other in the Seventh Circuit. Perhaps for that reason, the
circuit court opinions are studied more than is the Supreme
Court’s affirmance.40 Marshall was convicted of distributing more
than ten grams of “a mixture or substance containing more than
a detectable amount of LSD.”41 The LSD, which weighs next to
nothing, was sold on blotter paper, which is more than 100 times
as heavy as the drug itself.42 Nonetheless, both the Seventh
Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. This, as
Judge Posner wrote in dissent, resulted in the penalty per dose
of LSD to exceed the per-dose penalty for other drugs to an
extent that makes little sense.43 The best explanation is that
Congress wrote a law in which LSD was treated like powder
38

Amalgamated, 448 F.3d at 1098 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (internal citations

omitted).
39
40
41
42
43

908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990).
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
Marshall, 908 F.2d at 1314-15.
Id. at 1315.
Id. at 1332-34 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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drugs, such as heroin, because those who wrote the law did not
know that the various drugs covered by the statute were neither
manufactured nor sold in a comparable way.44
Not all legislative errors are created equal. Judge
Easterbrook’s majority opinion is not about taking advantage of
linguistic accidence, but rather about taking advantage of
legislative ignorance. There is no doubt that Congress
intentionally punished LSD as it did. Favoring consideration of
purpose in deciding which of two available readings should be
accepted does nothing to compromise respect for the
constitutionally mandated legislative process. Correcting
linguistic errors in drafting intrudes further into the legislative
process, but does no more than attempt to arrive at the
legislature’s communicative intent. As noted above, we
routinely compensate for grammatical errors in the speech of
others, unselfconsciously drawing from the language the
intended meaning.45
The correction of legislative errors that concern
mistakes of fact resulting in the enactment of senseless laws
are more difficult, however. When the mistake is a scrivener’s
error, the statutory interpreter who corrects the error says in
essence, “You said x, but you meant to say y.” When, in
contrast, the mistake is one of basing a law on an erroneous set
of facts, the interpreter who corrects the error instead must say
the equivalent of, “You intended to accomplish goal g by virtue
of enacting law x. But x does not accomplish g. Rather, y does.
So I will change x to y to assist you in achieving g.” Changing a
law to better accomplish the legislature’s goal is more of an
intrusion into the legislative process, and reasonable judges
and scholars are likely to disagree about its propriety. Perhaps
the appropriate solution of this case would have been to declare
the law unconstitutional as applied, since the penalty, in the
statutory scheme, lacks a rational basis.
III.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND JUDICIAL CANDOR

Judges must both decide disputes and explain the
reasons for their decisions. Often, it is suggested, judges make
decisions based on personal values, their own politics, or
perhaps an unarticulated sense of the best decision under the

44
45

See id. at 1333-34.
See Frazier & Clifton, supra note 13.
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law, which then must be justified post hoc. Gaps between
reasonable inferences about what drove a judge to decide a case
and the reasons for the decision that the judge articulates
create the inference that judges are not being candid. David
Shapiro describes the importance of judicial candor:
A requirement that judges give reasons for their decisions—grounds
of decision that can be debated, attacked, and defended—serves a
vital function in constraining the judiciary’s exercise of power. In the
absence of an obligation of candor, this constraint would be greatly
diluted, since judges who regard themselves as free to distort or
misstate the reasons for their actions can avoid the sanctions of
criticism and condemnation that honest disclosure of their
motivation may entail. In a sense, candor is the sine qua non of all
other restraints on abuse of judicial power, for the limitations
imposed by constitutions, statutes, and precedents count for little if
judges feel free to believe one thing about them and to say another.
Moreover, lack of candor seldom goes undetected for long, and its
detection only serves to increase the level of cynicism about the
nature of judging and of judges.46

As Judge Posner points out in How Judges Think, the
issue of candor arises more with the judges of high courts, the
Supreme Court in particular, since those jurists have far more
discretion than do lower court judges.47 Moreover, the cases
most likely to generate published opinions are the more
controversial ones, increasing the likelihood that a judge’s
personal values will infiltrate the decision-making process.
It is hard to believe it an accident that the five most
conservative justices voted as they did in Ledbetter (the
employment discrimination statute of limitations case), and
that the four more liberal justices opposed them in dissent. It
appears that the justices had reason to vote as they did based
on their political and personal values, and used the linguistic
opening as an opportunity to further these values. Not all cases
involving assertive fetishism involve a lack of candor, just as
not all cases that concern candor raise the moral issues
discussed here. Nonetheless, the relationship between the two
issues creates particularly troubling set of examples. Judges
who simultaneously construe statutes in a way consistent with
the language but inconsistent with the statute’s purpose, do so
to further their own values, and hide the ball about all of this.
46

David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731,
737 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
47
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 269-323 (2008) (chapter entitled
“The Supreme Court Is a Political Court”).

2011] STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, MORALITY, AND THE TEXT 1045

As for whether this lack of sincerity is appropriate, I
agree with Professor Shapiro that it should be kept to a
minimum. A recent article by Micah Schwartzman argues that
judicial sincerity is important to a democracy, for people are
entitled to know the reasons behind the ways in which the state
treats them.48 While the lawyer may be insincere, the judge plays
a different role. Yet, as Judge Posner points out, the
requirement that judges write only about legitimate legal
arguments severely restricts their decision-making options, and
preserves rule of law values at least in part.49 The practice
essentially tells judges: “Whatever your actual motivations for
making a decision, unless you can justify it in legal terms to the
legal community, you should not go there.” I surely do not
recommend that judges cease this practice. However, when other
values are self-evidently driving the decision-making process,
this practice most likely comes at some cost in credibility.
A model for judicial sincerity in this context is Chief
Justice John Marshall’s decision in United States v.
Wiltberger.50 A statute that federalized crimes committed on
American vessels on the high seas, defined “high seas” to
include rivers in other countries for most of the crimes, but
failed to do so for the crime of manslaughter, with which
Wiltberger was charged.51 Marshall, in his opinion, admitted
that the legislature most likely intended to include this crime,
but decided that the rule of lenity, which at the very least
prohibits courts from expanding criminal liability beyond any
reasonable reading of the statute, was the more important
principle to apply.52 Thus, Marshall placed other values above
the intent of the legislature. But he did not do so by either
ignoring and flouting that intent as an opportunity to impose
his own values, nor by pretending that he was unable to
discern the legislature’s intent in such an obvious case. Rather,
he placed his own hierarchy of values on the table, an act of
judicial candor and commitment to avoiding the immorality of
disrespecting communicative intent while pretending not to be
doing so. Reasonable minds can disagree with Justice
48
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Marshall’s ruling, but he cannot be accused of falling prey to
assertive fetishism.
IV.

CONCLUSION

I have argued in this essay that the legal system loses
some moral high ground when judges take advantage of
linguistic indeterminacy to flout the intent of the legislature to
accomplish its goals. How important this is depends in part
upon how much legitimacy is lost when the law operates in a
manner that is inconsistent with the moral intuitions of
citizens.53 I assume that there is at least some loss of legitimacy
when judges make arguments that are both transparently
insincere and wrongful in their treatment of language.
I conclude by addressing some objections that may be
made in response to my analysis.
First, the legislature’s purpose is not always obvious.
When statutes contain compromise, the purpose of a statute is
to accomplish legislative goals to the extent that the
compromises have allowed these goals to go forward. As Justice
Scalia describes it, “the purpose of a statute includes not only
what it sets out to change, but also what it resolves to leave
alone.”54 To some extent, Scalia is correct. Nonetheless, when
the question is which of two readings of a statute licensed by
the language is the better one, we are not dealing with a
question of unexpressed purpose or intent. In Ledbetter, for
example, it is difficult to come up with any reason for Congress
to have written a statute consistent with the majority position.
My point is not that looking at text should be replaced by
looking at purpose; in fact, I cannot think of anyone who takes
that position as a general matter. Rather, my point is that
when language is either uncertain or clearly mistaken, it is
simply wrong to use the uncertainty to interpret a law in a
manner that thwarts the communicative intent of the law.
Second, one reason for reliance on text is that the
legislature wrote the text, so sticking to the language creates
fewer opportunities for judicial activism. Again, this is true
when the decision is between paying attention to the language
53
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on the one hand, or unexpressed purpose on the other. But
paying attention to both ipso facto reduces judicial discretion.
For the intersection of two considerations (in this case language
and purpose) can be no greater than either of the considerations
individually. To conclude otherwise reflects an error in
reasoning that Kahneman and Tversky have called “the
conjunction fallacy.”55 In their most famous example, a feminist
named Linda who takes a job as a bank teller cannot be more
likely to be a “feminist bank teller” than to be either a feminist
or a bank teller.56 Yet people engage in this fallacy as a result of
the mental models they form about the intersection of these
traits. By the same token, if linguistic indeterminacy leaves two
sensible interpretations, requiring that judges examine these
interpretations with respect to furthering the legislature’s
purpose cannot, as a logical matter, expand the number of
possible readings that the judge has the discretion to impose.
Third, there is one important difference between my
stories about everyday deception on the one hand, and the
undermining of legislative purpose on the other: the latter is
transparent. When I deceive you about Hannes’s whereabouts,
you cannot turn to a record, or to a dissenting opinion to learn
the truth of the matter. On the contrary, if I am successful at
deceiving you, you will never discover the truth. That is my
very goal. Nonetheless, the presence of a public record, which
includes opinions that run contrary to the offending one, does
not excuse an individual judge from taking responsibility for a
morally unjustified position. The fact that a bad act—even a
bad interpretive act—is discoverable does not convert it into a
good act. But the transparency does provide a partial
vindication of the legal system as a whole, and is a positive
attribute of the American legal order.
Far more serious an objection to my position is the fact
that the legal system might be doing the best it can whether or
not I am right about the status of using language to flout
purpose. If, for example, the kinds of cases that I describe
rarely arise, but the value of focusing on linguistic nuance as a
general matter enhances rule of law values, then perhaps it is
best to tolerate small moral failures at the margins of a just
and legitimate system. For example, a great deal of value is
placed on requiring that statutory interpretation respect the
55
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legislative process that led to the law’s enactment in the first
place. I personally do not accept the argument that such
linguistic fidelity excuses the legal system from acting in a way
that we would regard as immoral in our everyday lives. The
loss of legitimacy is not worth any perceived gains, and when it
comes to construing statutes whose language is susceptible of
only a single interpretation, there is no gain. However, if those
who defend the status quo recognize the obligation to defend
this balance of insincerity at the margins against the benefits
of practices that reinforce formal and systemic values, then
progress will have been made.

